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CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD 
939 F.3D 798 (6TH CIR.  2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
 After the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) concluded 
that Charter Communications Inc. (Charter) repeatedly violated the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and discharged employee 
Johnathan French with anti-union animus in violation of the NLRA, 
Charter petitioned the Sixth Circuit to review the Board’s decisions. 
The Court found that there was sufficient evidence supporting the 
Board’s determination and denied Charter’s petition for review and 
granted the General Counsel’s petition for enforcement.  
 
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
 The NLRA guarantees an employee’s right “to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”1 An employer violates 
this provision when “substantial evidence demonstrates that the 
employer's actions, considered from the employees' point of view, had a 
reasonable tendency to coerce.” 2  
 Jonathan French who worked as an auditor at Charter and a few 
other employees decided they wanted better pay by unionizing. French 
reached out to a local chapter union organizer French created a set of 
pro-union flyers to distribute at the Charter office. In the three months 
that followed Charter observed the hand billing on site and had a 
manger watching take notes of who was interested in the union 
information, further surveilled and interrogated employees, reassigned 
French’s union sympathizing group to remote work locations, an 
eventually fired French and two other employees. After his termination, 
French brought this action to the NLRB who concluded Charter had 
committed violations of NLRA.  
 The court recognized that the Appellate Court’s review of a 
Board decision is “quite limited” and applies a deferential standard, 
                                                 
1 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018). 
2 Caterpillar Logistics, Inc. v. NLRB, 835 F.3d 536, 543 (6th Cir. 2016) (brackets 
omitted) (quoting Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 402 F.3d 651, 659 (6th Cir. 
2005)). 
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requiring that they uphold the NLRB’s factual determinations as 
sufficient if they are supported by “such relevant evidence as a 
reasoned mind might accept s adequate to support a conclusion”.3 The 
court analyzed each of the five violations of the Act: (1) surveillance of 
the union hand billing, (2) the surveillance, (3) the interrogation, (4) 
reassignment of employees to rural areas, (5) safety check and finally 
the alleged discriminatory discharge of French and two other 
employees. In analyzing these incidences, the court relied on various 
provisions of the NLRA and found sufficient evidence to support the 
Board’s finding of a violation of each of the five incidences.  
 Turning to the discharge of French, the court used the Wright 
Line burden shift test, the court found that there was enough evidence, 
with to invite an inference of anti-union animus due to the fact that 
French was terminated three months after reaching out to union 
organizers, making pro-union flyers and suggesting organizers 
distribute them, leading Charter to know French was involved. In 
addition, in those three months are when all the violations of the Act 
occurred further weighing toward anti-union sentiments. With the 
burden shifted to Charter, they were unable to prove that they would 
have made the same employment decision regardless of French’s 
protected activity because the evidence suggested the Charter failure to 
conduct even a rudimentary investigation into the stated basis for 
French’s discharge.4 The court found the evidence supported a finding 
of pretext under 29 U.S.C.A § 158(a)(3). 5 
 Finally, in analyzing the discharge of the two other employees, 
the Board recognized that it was ““immaterial that the employee was 
not in fact  engaging in union activity as long as that was the employer's 
perception and the employer was motivated to act based on that 
perception.”6 The court noted evidence that Charter’s perceptions of the 
two employees was linked to union sympathies because the evidence on 
the record that the employer asked them how they felt about the union 
and told them to steer clear of it, the fact  they were included in the 
group assigned to rural areas after their names came up after the hand 
billing incident, and the fact that they were discharged on the same day 
as French.7 Meeting the first prong, the court ruled that the second stage 
of the Wright Line test of pretextual nondiscriminatory reasons for 
discharge was met because there was evidence that suggested that 
                                                 
3 Charter Commc'ns, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 939 F.3d 798, 809 (6th Cir. 
2019). 
4 Id.  
5 Id. 
6 Dayton Hudson Dep't Store Co., 324 N.L.R.B. 33, 35 (1997). 
7 Charter, 939 F.3d at 818.  
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employees were not fired for the same conduct the employer pointed to 
as reason for termination.8  
 
Holding: 
 
 The Court held that surveilling union hand billing, creating an 
impression of surveillance, threatening closer supervision because of 
union activity, soliciting grievances from employees during union 
organizing campaign, reassigning employees suspected of union 
organizing to rural areas,  threatening employee with reprisal for his 
union activity were substantial evidence supporting the Board’s 
determination that the employer engaged in unfair labor practice. In 
addition, the court held that there was sufficient evidence of employer’s 
anti-union animus to support the Board’s determination that an 
employer had engaged in unfair labor practice by discharging an 
employee and other employees because of their perceived union 
activity.  
 
Impact:  
 
 This case will likely have an impact on Labor Relations Board 
decisions that are looking for examples of what constitutes as 
substantial evidence for unfair labor practice as it relates to treatment of 
union activity of its employees. Overall, the ruling enforces the idea 
that a finding by the NLRA Board is difficult to overturn upon review 
of an appellate court because the standard of review is so minimal and 
deferential that anything a reasoned mind might find adequate qualifies 
as sufficient evidence. Mostly, it is positive precedent in protection for 
union sympathizers in California.  
 
 
 
JOMAA V. UNITED STATES 
940 F.3D 291 (6TH CIR. 2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
 After Georgiana Rizk’s daughter’s visa petition revocation by 
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) was 
then affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) the 
noncitizen and her daughter appealed the decision. The USCIS had 
                                                 
8 Id. at 819. 
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denied the noncitizen mother’s daughter because her mother had 
obtained citizen status by a fraudulent marriage. The Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the judgement of the district court dismissing her claim.   
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
 Under 5 U.S.C.A §706(2)(A) an agency decision is arbitrary 
and capricious if an agency fails to examine relevant evidence or 
articulate satisfactory explanation for decision and a review of agency 
decision under the Administrative Procedure At the court must ensure 
that the agency action is in accordance with law, such that there is not 
conflict with language of statute relied upon by agency.9  
 The USCOS initially granted Rizk’s petition but later revoked 
it, saying it should have never granted it in the first place because Riszk 
had entered into a sham marriage, making her ineligible for a future 
visa pursuant to §206 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).10 
Rizk claims the second decision was arbitrary and capricious. The 
USCIS cites to 8 U.S.C.A §1154(c) which states, “orphan petitions 
approved for a single petitioner; prohibition against approval in cases of 
marriages entered into in order to evade immigration laws; restriction 
on future entry of aliens involved with marriage fraud.11 The USCIS 
had denied citizenship to the daughter of the noncitizen mother because 
according to the statute, that was the consequence of obtaining 
citizenship falsely by means of a fraudulent marriage.  
Rizk’s appeal was based on the argument that 8 U.S.C. §1154 
did not apply to her and thus, did not have the resulting effect on her 
daughter. Plaintiff contends that the provision cannot apply to her 
because she did not have fraudulent marriage certificates but that she 
was legally married to Mr. Derbass because she even had a marriage 
ceremony claiming that she entered the two-year marriage in good 
faith.12 However, the immigration officer who had interviewed her 
under oath reported that she had given no in evidence of shared 
residence with the alleged husband and gave conflicting statements 
about the fatherhood of her children and the whereabouts of her first 
alleged ex-husband, Mohamed Jomaa. Evidence also came to light she 
Rizk had been married to Mohamed Derbass while still married to 
Jomaa.13 The court reasoned that the lack of fraudulent marriage 
certificates was not the issue, but the emphasis was on the level of 
                                                 
9 5 U.S.C.A § 706(2)(A). 
10 8 U.S.C.A § 1154(c).  
11 Id. 
12 Jomaa v. United States, 940 F.3d 291, 293 (6th Cir. 2019) 297.  
13 Id. at 294.  
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deception to evade immigration officials.14 Because Rizk had tried not 
only to deceive the USCIS but also the state of Michigan as to her 
eligibility to marry when she tried to enter into a bigamous marriage 
where the marriage should have been “null and void because, at the 
time of their marriage, [one participant] was still legally married to 
someone else.”15 The court reasoned that, on the contrary, a fraudulent 
marriage more than fraudulent documents, warranted a more severe 
punishment if anything.16 Rizk admitted that she “met Derbass in a 
family setup deal so she could come to the United States.”17 With this 
undeniable evidence of a sham marriage, according to Section 1154(C) 
the petition for immediate relative status must be revoked by reason of 
a marriage determined to have been entered into for the purpose of 
evading the immigration laws.18 
  
 Holding: 
 
 The court held that a marriage which is void because of a prior 
existing marriage and which was entered into for the same purpose of 
evading immigration laws and where no bona fide husband and wife 
relationship ever existed or was intended is the kind of situation to 
which Section 1154(c) is applicable. Since the USCIS revoked the 
Rizk’s petition because it discovered that it had revoked her mother’s 
prior visa because she had entered into a sham marriage while married 
to another was not a discretionary act but one driven by Section 1154(c) 
provision. Therefore, the USCIS’s decision to revoke the petition was 
not arbitrary and capricious.  
 
Impact:  
  
Congress has demonstrated a growing concern about marriage 
fraud as shown by the passing of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Act 
of 1986. This case, too, emphasizes decisions further defining Section 
§1154 revoking visa petitions not just for fraud in marriage documents 
but for the fraudulent use of marriage itself.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Id. at 298. 
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 299.  
18 Id. at 298.  
Spring 2020        Legal Summaries91 
 
 
CALIFORNIA BY AND THROUGH BROWN V. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY 
938 F.3D 1371 (6TH CIR. 2019) 
 
 
Synopsis: 
 
 After the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) revised its 
determination of greenhouse gas emission standards, a coalition of 
states, environmental groups and electric industry representatives 
brought petitions for review of the new determination claiming they 
were not appropriate, violated procedural and substantive requires of 
relations and was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA). However, under the APA only “final action” is 
reviewable. The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of 
jurisdiction because it found that the EPA’s determination was not 
judicially reviewable since it was only announcing its intention to 
revisit its original determination. 
 
 
Facts and Analysis: 
  
 Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) provides that the 
EPA can ““prescribe (and from time to time revise)” standards for “the 
emission of any air pollutant from ... new motor vehicles or new motor 
vehicle engines,” which “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which 
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”19 
The Secretary of Transportation delegated rulemaking authority to the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) has 
rulemaking authority from the Secretary of Transportation to  work 
together with the EPA to publish emission and fuel economy standards 
for 2017 to 2025 vehicles.20 Because of this long time frame and 
NHTSA’s need to conduct a further rulemaking to finalize the augural 
standards, the agencies also committed in 2012 to conduct a 
“comprehensive mid-term evaluation,” which would include public 
notice and comment.21 If, at the end of the mid-term evaluation, EPA 
concluded that the 2012 standards remained appropriate under Section 
202(a), that determination would be “final agency action . . . subject to 
                                                 
19 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018).  
20 California ex  rel. Brown v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 940 F.3d 1342, (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
21 Id. at 1346.  
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judicial review on its merits.”22 At this midterm evaluation, the EPA 
announced it would consider a rulemaking to potentially alter current 
2012 greenhouse gas emission standards for vehicles model year 2022 
to 2025.  
Plaintiffs sought vacatur of the Revised Determination claiming 
it was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. 
EPA stated that the “current standards remain in effect” and stated that 
the Revised Determination was “not a final agency action.”23 
Under the Clean Air Act only “final action is reviewable.24 The 
court analyzed if the determination was “final action” according to 5 
U.S.C.A §704 agency action is only final if the action “marks the 
consummation of the agency’s decision-making process rather than 
being merely tentative or interlocutory in nature and if the action is one 
by which rights or obligations are determined or from which legal 
consequences will flow”.25 The court reasoned that the Revised 
Determination failed the second prong because the Revised 
Determination only creates a possibility that there might be a change in 
the future but explicitly states that the current standards remain in effect 
until a formal rulemaking by the EPA, nor did they explain exactly how 
the 2012 standards would be modified under Section 12(h) only 
implying with hypothetical language that they “may be too stringent”.26  
The State Petitioners contended that even so, the Revised 
Determination still had tangible effect because it “wiped away the EPS’ 
previous assurance that the existing standards would remain legally 
binding.”27 In response, Section 177 states and the District of Columbia 
needed to act quickly before a final rule was published in order to put in 
the standards in place within the required two-year lead time to ensure 
they were in compliance by the time the potential new standards will be 
applicable.28 The court stated that although the states may be “prudent” 
to act quickly based on the predicted new standards based on a potential 
new rule, a state’s voluntary actions or compulsions do not rise to level 
of legal consequences making the order final agency action.29 The court 
added that if the EPA’s rulemaking results in changes to the existing 
standards, it will still be required to provide a reasoned explanation and 
                                                 
22 77 Fed. Reg. at 62, 784.  
23 Notice of Intention to Reconsider the Final Determination, 82 Fed. Reg. 14,671,  
14,671 (Mar. 22, 2017).  
2442 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)  
25 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78, (1997). 
26 Brown, 940 F.3d at 1350.  
27 Id. at 1352. 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
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cannot ignore prior factual findings and the supporting record evidence 
contradicting the new policy.30 
 
Holding: 
 
 The court likened the Revised Determination more akin to an 
agency’s grant of a petition for reconsideration of a rule, creating a 
possibility not a certainty of an adjustment to the underlying rule.31 The 
same way the court is led to a different conclusion based on the 
outcome of a petition for reconsideration either deciding to stay the 
course or consider changing the standards, the EPA’s final decision 
determines rights and obligations but not before then. The Court of 
Appeals held that EPAs’ decision to revisit greenhouse gas emission 
standards it had adopted for motor vehicles was not judicially 
reviewable final action.  
 
Impact:  
 Going forward, petitioners wishing to stall deleterious effects of 
new rules from pending changes declared by administrative agencies, 
will not be able to be proactive about avoiding effects of the new rule 
because the court has said there is no jurisdiction to review an 
administrative order that does not have indices of finality or concrete 
legal consequences. The ruling of this case essentially states that 
petitioners asking for review of determinations would be wise to wait 
until the announcement has been positively enacted as a rule that 
affirmatively compels them to act.  
 
 
NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES 
414 F. SUPP. 3D 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
Nineteen states, the District of Columbia, three local 
governments, and health care provider associations filed suits against 
the Department of Health and Human Service (HHS) claiming the 
HHS’s new “conscience rule” clarifying Federal health care provider 
conscience statutes violated Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 
Spending Clause, Establishment Clause, and Separation of Powers. 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The rule clarified conscience objections to 
                                                 
30 Id. at 1353.  
31 Id. at 1351.  
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participating in federally-funded medical procedures, programs, 
services, or research activities. principally addressing objections to 
abortion, sterilization, and assisted suicide in addition to counseling and 
referrals related to those services.32 The United States District Court 
found that the rule was not wholly unconstitutional but did violate the 
APA’s procedural requirements and vacated the entire rule. 
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
The plaintiffs took issue with a rule recently promulgated by the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) 
entitled “Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in Health Care; 
Delegations of Authority”(the “Rule”).33 HHS had published the 2019 
rule because the withdrawal of the 2008 Rule had created confusion 
about the Conscience Provision.34 The Rule purports to interpret and 
provide for the implementation of more than 30 statutory provisions 
that recognize the right of an individual or entity to abstain from 
participation in medical procedures, programs, services, or research 
activities on account of a religious or moral objection.35  
Plaintiffs argue this rule was issued in violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) alleging Congress didn’t delegate 
rulemaking authority to HHS and is unconstitutional allege its violating 
Spending Clause, Establishment Clause, Separation of Powers, and the 
First Amendment.36 They ask the Court to enter summary judgment 
invalidating the Rule based on the administrative record, or 
alternatively, to enter a preliminary injunction staying the Rule's 
implementation pending further review. As to the APA, plaintiffs argue 
that the Rule exceeds HHS's statutory authority, was not adopted in 
accordance with law, is arbitrary and capricious, and was adopted in 
breach of APA procedural requirements. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), 
(C)–(D). As to the Constitution, plaintiffs principally argue that the 
Rule conflicts with the Spending, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and 
Establishment Clauses, id. amend. I, and violates the Separation of 
Powers.37 
                                                 
32 New York v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 414 F. Supp. 3d 475 
(S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
33 84 Fed. Reg. 23,170 (May 21, 2019) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88) (the “Rule” 
or “2019 Rule”). 
34 Id. at 506. 
35 Id. at 496. 
36 Id. at 497. 
37 Id. at 497. 
Spring 2020        Legal Summaries95 
 
First the court looked at the alleged APA violation as the court 
is required by the APA to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action 
that is arbitrary and capricious.” In respect to all Conscience 
Provisions, the Court found that HHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
in promulgating the Rule, in violation of § 706(2)(A) of the APA, 
because (1) HHS's stated reasons for undertaking rulemaking are not 
substantiated by the record before the agency, (2) HHS did not 
adequately explain its change in policy, and (3) HHS failed to consider 
important aspects of the problem before it.38 
The court also looked at if the rule was within the HHS’s 
authority to make in the first place and whether it simply clarified 
(housekeeping) or disrupted the status quo. HHS was not expressly 
granted rulemaking authority in “housekeeping statutes”, the court 
ruled that the text and history of the housekeeping provisions only gives 
authority to make internal department affairs, internal agency 
administration does not give the HHS authority to make rules regarding 
substantive legal obligations of regulated entities.39 The HHS was never 
delegated, nor did they have substantive rule-making authority 
announces new rights and imposes new duties—one that shapes the 
primary conduct of regulated entities.  
Next the court took up the issue that the rule that HHS proposed 
did not provide an exception for emergencies which the court found 
was different than existing conscience laws. Specifically, by its terms, 
EMTALA does not include any exception for religious or moral 
refusals to provide emergency care. 40 The court generally agrees ... that 
the requirement under EMTALA that certain hospitals treat and 
stabilize patients who present in an emergency does not conflict with 
Federal conscience and anti-discrimination laws,”41 such as the other 
statutes that contain Conscience Provisions: the Church Amendment, 
Coats-Snowe Amendment, Medicare and Medicaid act. 42 In its 
rulemaking, it faulted HHS for not providing a carve out not allowing 
objections to procedures in non- emergency situations. HHS did state in 
the Rule, in its cost-benefit analysis, that it estimates that a little over 
5% of “recipients will spend an average of 4 hours to update policies 
and procedures, implement staffing or scheduling practices that respect 
an exercise of conscience rights under Federal law, or disseminate the 
recipient's policies or procedures.”43 But the agency then adds the 
observation that “[i]f entities were already fully taking steps to be 
                                                 
38 Id. at 575. 
39 Id. at 520. 
40 Id. at 537. 
41 Id. at 555. 
42 Id. at 519. 
43 Id. at 23, 241. 
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educated on, and comply with, all the laws that are the subject of this 
rule, there would likely not be any costs.”44 That statement reflects the 
agency's central misapprehension that the Rule does not mark a 
substantive departure from the status quo. That misapprehension calls 
into grave question the agency's summary assessment of the affected 
reliance interests as minimal.45 creating conflicts with the legal 
frameworks set by Title VII and EMTALA as to when religious or 
conscience objections must be accommodated in the health care arena. 
As explained below, because the 2019 Rule disrupts the reliance 
interests of various entities based on the status quo, HHS was obliged to 
consider the Rule's impact on these interests, and give “a more detailed 
justification” for a disruption of these interests. 
In respect to the Constitutional arguments, the court found that 
the plaintiffs were wrong about the Establishment Clause Violation 
because it is facially neutral, but found the rule was in violation of the 
Spending Clause and separation of powers. The court ruled that the 
Establishment Clause failed the facial challenge fail because it equally 
recognizes secular (moral) and religious objections in encompassing all 
conscience based either from secular or religious. 46 However, court 
ruled it was a violation of the Spending Clause because complete 
termination of funding violated the prohibition of coercion the 
Spending Clause protects, namely “financial inducement offered” must 
not be “so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into 
compulsion.’47 The Court found it “unlikely that a State would have 
accepted federal funds had it known it would be bound [by the 
purported condition].48  
Because the court found the Rule was issued in violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706, and was 
unconstitutional the court warranted vacatur of the entire rule. The 
Court's noted their decision leaves HHS at liberty to consider and 
promulgate rules governing these provisions. In the future, however, 
the agency must do so within the confines of the APA and the 
Constitution.49  
 
Holding: 
 
                                                 
44 Id. at 241.  
45 Id. at 554. 
46 Id. at 164. 
47 Id. at 569 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 178.  
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 The Court of Appeals held that the conscience rule was 
substantive rather than housekeeping and thus exceeded HHS’s 
rulemaking authority It also found that HHS exceeded its enforcement 
authority, acting contrary to Title VII and Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) in promulgating the conscience 
rule. In addition, the court ruled that HHS’s promulgation of the 
conscience rule was arbitrary and capricious and that the rule’s 
definition of discrimination was not a logical outgrowth of notice of 
proposed rulemaking. Finally, the court found that the rule’s 
authorization of termination of all HHS funding violated separation of 
powers and the Spending Clause.  
 
Impact:  
 
The court made sure to make clear that their decision in this 
case was not going to curtail the rule-making ability of the HHS. On the 
contrary the court said its decision leaves HHS at liberty to create and 
promulgate rules as long as they do so within the confines of the APA 
and the constitution.  
 
 
UNITED STATES V BALDE  
943 F.3D 73 (2D CIR. 2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
After pleading guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(5)(A) 
and 924(a)(2) (unlawful possession of a firearm by an alien illegally or 
unlawfully in the United States) Souleymane Balde again appealed to 
the Second Circuit to dismiss the indictment claiming his plea was in 
error in light of a Supreme Court’s recent decision articulating another 
element the government must prove to convict under §922(g)(5)(A) and 
§924(a)(2). Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
requires a valid plea to be knowingly and intelligently entered into, 
with knowledge of the nature of each charge to which the defendant is 
pleading. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it would be a 
violation of Mr. Balde’s rights to impose consequences of a plea that 
contained a newly added element of which he was not aware at the time 
of the plea. The Second Circuit Court vacated his guilty plea and 
granted a petition for rehearing. 
  
Facts and Analysis: 
 
98Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law 
Judiciary 40-1 
 
Title 18 of the United States Code, section 922 (g)(5)(A) 
explains the federal law prohibiting possession of a firearm by 
individuals illegally or unlawfully in the United States.50 For 
noncitizens who are not lawful permanent residents in the United 
States, the government must prove that, the individual was illegally or 
unlawfully in the United States.51   
Souleymane Balde, a citizen of Guinea, moved to the United 
States without lawful immigration status as a child. He scheduled an 
interview with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
to become a lawful permanent resident in 2005 but could not make it to 
the interview because of intervening circumstances. His application was 
consequently denied and he was given an order of removal that was 
unable to be carried out because his expired Guinean passport stymied 
deportation.52 He sought supervised release from detention and 
remained at liberty under supervision of immigration officials. Balde 
explicitly expressed that he thought this status was considered parole 
and that at the time of the guilty plea in this case parole constituted 
lawful immigration status.53 Seven years later in December 2015, his 
removal order still pending against him, he possessed and fired a gun.54 
Due to his immigration status, the court had little trouble concluding 
that he was well within the category of individuals prohibited from 
owning firearms under 922(g)(5)(A).55 He pled guilty to a violation of 
unlawful possession of a firearm by “an alien ... [who] is illegally or 
unlawfully in the United States,”56  
However, eight days after the court’s first opinion in this case, 
the Supreme Court ruled in another case involving a possession of 
firearms by a person of uncertain immigration status that “in a 
prosecution under 922(g) and 942(a)(2) the government must prove that 
the defendant knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons 
barred from possessing a firearm”.57 Balde appeals arguing he did not 
know at that time that he was in the United States illegally, the record 
fails to establish a factual basis for his plea, therefore he is not guilty of 
violating the new interpretation of the elements of 922(g) and the 
conviction must be reversed under the plain error standard. 58 
                                                 
50 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (West 2019). 
51 Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191, (2019). 
52 United States v. Balde, 943 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2019). 
53 Id. at 97.  
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 87. 
56 Id. at 77. 
57 Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. at 2194.  
58 Id. at 88.  
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 The court noted that the issue of his immigration status was 
“hotly contested” in the original case.59 The court reasoned that even if 
Balde was aware of the knowledge element, under the present record, 
the government’s arguments were not so strong that they would leave 
Balde without a plausible defense at trial and no choice but to plead 
guilty.60 Therefore, the court found that Balde had sufficiently 
demonstrated a “reasonable probability that, [had he been properly 
advised of what we now have been instructed are the elements of the 
offense], he would not have entered the plea.”61 
 
Holding: 
 
After determining the plea violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, the court found the plain error standard met by 
the district court’s failure to advise Balde of the government’s need to 
establish that he knew was illegally present in the United States. The 
plain error “seriously affect[ing] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings” was met because of the possibility 
that Balde pled guilty and sentenced to prison for a crime of which, as 
the Supreme Court now defines it, he was not guilty of all elements.62 
The court declined to express an opinion as to what Balde, in fact, 
believed at the time of his plea, ruling that was a question of fact for a 
jury to decide on remand.63 The Second Circuit vacated his guilty plea 
and remanded the case for rehearing including the element of 
knowledge.64 
  
Impact:  
 
The fallout of this case is likely to impact those cases that 
involve non-citizens owning firearms and others under the umbrella of 
922(g). The ruling of this case is essentially states that cases, after 
application of the Supreme Court’s precedent in Rehaif need to prove 
an added essential element of knowledge that the defendant in fact, 
knew that he or she was in the country illegally. This case is not 
necessarily informative for a wholesale retroactive application, since 
this case was appealed so close to the Supreme Court’s ruling on the 
new element. It seems like a ruling that benefits immigrant firearm 
                                                 
59 Id. at 97. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 98. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 97. 
64 Id.  
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users by adding a difficult to prove “mens rea” element to the 
government’s burden in these cases.  
 
 
 
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO  V. UNITED STATES 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES  
944 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
After, counties, states and organizations won motions for stay 
and preliminary injunctions on their actions challenging Department of 
Homeland Security’s (DHS) final rule, DHS filed interlocutory appeals 
and emergency motion to stay injunctions. Under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) determining whether an alien was a “public 
charge” for the purpose of  The court granted the motion for stay and 
the preliminary injunction finding that the DHS’s re-interpretation of 
“public charge” was not arbitrary or capricious because the term as 
used by the INA was ambiguous and therefore allowed additional 
definition.  
   
Facts and Analysis: 
 
According to the IRA aliens who seek lawful admission or 
permanent resident status into the United States may be inadmissible if 
they are likely to become a public charge.65  “Public charge” is defined 
as someone “likely to become primarily dependent on the government 
for subsistence, as demonstrated by either (i) the receipt of public cash 
assistance for income maintenance or (ii) institutionalization for long-
term care at government expense.” 66 In August 2019 the DHS, acting 
under the authority vested in the secretary of homeland security to 
establish immigration regulations, adopted a new rule adding several 
new factors to consider in making a “public charge” determination. 
These new factors included:” whether the individual can demonstrate 
“current employment, employment history, or a reasonable prospect of 
future employment, a medical diagnosis that would.. interfere with the 
alien’s ability to be self-sufficient and whether or not they are receiving 
cash non-cash benefits such as food stamps, housing or rental 
                                                 
65 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361. 1182(a)(4).  
66 See 1999 Field Guidance, 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689.  
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assistance”.67 Prior to the rule taking effect, various state’s 
municipalities and organizations brought suits seeking a preliminary 
injunction against its implementation.68  
The States argue that the Final Rule is invalid because the new 
definition of “public charge” is contrary to the INA and the 
Rehabilitation Act. 69  
Under judicial review, a court can set aside an agency’s final 
action if it does not pass the two-pronged Chevron analysis or if it is 
found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise 
not in accordance with law.70 To two prong Chevron test is used to 
determine whether an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute 
that it administers is wrong: if Congress has explicitly spoken to the 
issue and whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.71  
The court went through the first prong of the Chevron analysis, 
applying traditional tools of statutory construction: text and history. 
First, as to text, since the phrase is ambiguous, encompassing a range of 
meanings, so long as the agency has defined the term within that range 
of meanings, the court has no ground for questioning the range of 
meanings, especially because the new factors do not limit the discretion 
of the officials to those factors but other factors can be considered as 
well, giving them considerable discretion as long as the new factors are 
considered at a minimum.72 In addition, when Congress grants an 
agency the authority to administer a statute by issuing regulations it 
presumes it will use that authority to resolve ambiguities in the 
statutory scheme. 73  
The court then looked at the historical understanding of “public 
charge” disagreeing with the district court, the court were unable to 
discern one fixed understanding of public charge since 1882.74 
Congress twice considered but never enacted a definition of “public 
charge”.75 The court determined that because the history indicated the 
agency has adopted different definitions in different contexts added 
force to the argument that the definition itself is flexible.76 Specifically, 
                                                 
67 City & Cty. of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 944 F.3d 
773, 783 (9th Cir. 2019).  
68 Id. at 780. 
69 Id. at 790.  
70 5 U.S.C. § 702(2)(A)(2018).  
71 Id. at 790. 
72 Id. at 792.  
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 796 
75 Id. at 797. 
76 Id. at 798. 
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self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration 
law since this country’s earliest immigration statutes.” Id. § 1601(1). As 
a result, “[i]t continues to be the immigration policy of the United 
States that ... aliens within the Nation’s borders not depend on public 
resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities 
and the resources of their families, their sponsors, and private 
organizations.”77 After passing the first prong, the court found the 
added definition met second prong of the Chevron test easily because it 
was rational and consistent with the statute as a permissible 
construction of the INA.78 Additionally it was not barred by the 
Rehabilitation act because individuals were not being denied admission 
solely based on a disability.79 The definition was in line with caselaw 
that made decisions based on an alien’s personal characteristics not a 
localized job shortage.80 Therefore the court found that the rule was not 
disqualified by rule of law.  
Next the court analyzed the decision by the arbitrary and 
capricious standard, the states said it failed to weigh costs to public 
health from disenrollment of those not subject to the public charge 
determination.81The court found the State’s arguments not strong 
because DHS raised and addressed many of the State’s concerns, when 
it addressed the comments to the rule.82  
The Second Circuit next had to decide whether to grant the stay 
by balancing irreparable harm with hardship and public interest. DHS 
had the burden of showing that there would some irreparable harm, and 
that on the balance of the hardships, the stay is in the public interest.83 
Irreparable is defined as “not be[ing] able to recover monetary 
damages.”84 The court reasoned that the harm of granting lawful-
permanent-resident status to aliens who would otherwise be public 
charges was irreparable. Then the court applied balance on the equities 
and the public interest together, considered the States financial, public-
health and administrative harms were largely short term resulting 
during the pendency of the proceedings in the district courts and any 
appeals to this court and the Supreme Court. The court found that 
compared to the irreparable non-monetary harm to the government, 
court could not say which harm was greater decided on the public 
                                                 
77 5 U.S.C. §1601(2) (2018).  
78 Id. at 799. 
79 Id. at 900.  
80 Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 10 (1915). 
81 Id. at 801. 
82 Id. at 804. 
83 Id. at 805. 
84 Id. at 806. 
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interest argument, a balance of the equities is not an exact science, and 
while both harms were speculative. Due to these “critical” factors and 
the fact that DHS had mustered a strong showing of likelihood of 
success on the merits and some irreparable harm, the court found a 
grant of the stay was warranted.85  
 
Holding: 
 
After deciding that “public charge” was ambiguous and that 
DHS’s interpretation was not arbitrary or capricious, the Second Circuit 
upheld DHS’s interpretation in accordance with the Chevron deference 
to which it was entitled. The decision rested on the fact that DHS had 
established a strong likelihood that the final rule did not violate the 
Rehabilitation Act.  
 
Impact:  
 
The amount of response during the 60 day public comment 
period suggests there are various stakeholders who believe the outcome 
of a challenge to this rule has a significant impact, applying to anyone 
applying for admission or adjustment of status after the after October 
15, 2019. This decision may mean a few new obstacles to overcome for 
those seeking to enter the United States or seeking to evade 
classification as “public charge.” The change means four factors weigh 
heavily against the alien in becoming a public charge but two factors 
weigh heavily in favor of the alien in a public charge determination. An 
unintended result would be a that the weight of these extra factors may 
cause aliens to disenroll from Medicaid and healthcare in order to avoid 
the determination that they are a public charge and be admitted for 
citizenship. However, as the court noted, these factors still give the 
officers significant discretion as they are part of many factors to be 
considered whose weighing is still an ad hoc balancing test so the 
added factors by DHS are not outcome determinative.  
 
 
CONSOL PENNSYLVANIA  V. FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH 
REVIEW COMMISSION 
941 F.3D 95 (3d Cir. 2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
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After the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 
upheld a $5,000 citation against him, a mine operator petitioned the 
Third Circuit Court for review of the citation issued by the Mine Safety 
and Health Administration (MSHA) for failure to notify them of an 
injury in his mine within 15 minutes of it occurring. In a case of first 
impression, the Third Circuit Court ruled that the mine operator had fair 
notice, the Commission had substantial evidence, and was required to 
impose the statutory minimum penalty. The Third Circuit denied the 
petition.  
  
Facts and Analysis: 
 
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (“the Mine 
Act”) says that “ When “the operator realizes that the death of an 
individual at the mine, or an injury or entrapment of an individual at the 
mine which has a reasonable potential to cause death, has occurred[,]” 
the notification must “be provided by the operator within 15 minutes.” 
86  
Coal miner Robert Stern was crushed between two multi-ton pieces of 
mining equipment and rushed to the hospital without delay.87 Not all of 
Stern’s symptoms gave cause for concern, as he appeared coherent, 
conscious, without any problem with his breathing, but at the same time 
he showed obvious signs of internal bleeding and he told those with 
him, “if something did happen to [him] please tell [his] wife and family 
that [he] love[s] them.”88 Consol Pennsylvania Coal Company, LLC 
notified MSHA two hours after the incident and MSHA inspector 
decided to issue a citation and the minimum fine under the statute, 
$5,000 .89 Consol first litigated the fine before an administrative law 
judge and then the Commission itself, raising three challenges: that the 
legal standard is inappropriate, the citation is not supported by 
substantial evidence, and the Commission was not bound by the 
mandatory minimum penalty.  
The court noted that they have never had occasion to interpret 
30 U.S.C. § 813(j) or 30 C.F.R. § 50.10(b), so it started from first 
principles of statutory and regulatory construction.90 As to textual 
interpretation, since the rule was plainly statute driven, not ambiguous, 
the court gave effect to its plain meaning. On its face, doesn’t specify 
                                                 
86 30 U.S.C. § 813(j) (2018). 
87 Consol Pennsylvania Coal Co., v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 
941 F.3d 95, 100 (3d Cir. 2019).  
88 Id. at 100.  
89 Id. at 99. 
90 Id. at 104.  
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the standard by which one is to determine whether an injury from a 
mine accident has a reasonable potential to cause death.91As to 
structure, first the court looked to the stated purpose to protect miners, 
not to balance miner safety with mine operators inconvenience.92 As to 
purpose, the court found that the intent  of the notification requirement 
to encourage rapid notification so MSHA can both respond to an 
emergency and preserve evidence to facilitate later investigation.93 
Thus, concern for the preservation “of any evidence which would assist 
in investigating the cause or causes” of accidents, and stabilities the 
situation and preserve vital evidence that can otherwise be easily lost.94 
After using the “traditional tools of construction” carefully considering 
the text, structure, history and purpose of the statute and the regulation, 
all justifying the Commission’s legal standard in light of the 
notification requirement should be interpreted to effectuate the goal of 
safety.95 Here, we have concluded that the Commission’s legal standard 
is plainly compelled by the statute and regulation. The court came to 
the conclusion that the Commission’s legal standard is sound.96 
Next, the court analyzed the claimed Due Process violation. The Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated for lack of fair notice if a 
statute or regulation “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence 
fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standard-less that it authorizes 
or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”97 In addition, fair 
notice is deemed given unless “the relevant standard is ‘so vague as to 
be no rule or standard at all[,]’98 With no evidence that the 
Commission’s legal standard was so vague to fall into that category.99 
Furthermore, the court notes that reasonable doubts are to be resolved 
in favor of notification.100  Thus the court ruled that Consul thus had 
fair notice of it.101  
In conclusion, the court ruled furthermore, no risk to miners 
would result from an erroneous MSHA notification, whereas substantial 
risk could result from a failure to notify, with MSHA being prevented 
from initiating an emergency response and beginning a successful 
                                                 
91 Id. at 106. 
92 Id. at 105. 
93 Id.  
94 Emergency Mine Evacuation, 71 Red. at 71,431, 71,435. 
95 Id. at 104, 106. 
96 Id. at 106. 
97 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2015). 
98 Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 250. 
99 Id. at 113. 
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investigation. 102 The court thus affirmed the Commission’s decision 
and denied the petition against the fine.  
 
Holding: 
 
 In determining if the Commission erred in its decisions, the 
court held that there was substantial evidence supported the 
Commission’s decision. The court held that it relied on the 
Commission’s totality of the circumstances test and a reasonable person 
standard to review the operator’s decision. The Third Circuit court’s 
decision rested on the fact that statue required the Commission to 
impose the stature minimum penalty on the operator. 
 
Impact:  
 
Most likely not widely applicable especially since this was a 
case of first impression. But for regulatory agencies it could mean 
precedent for rigid adherence to statutorily imposed fines as required by 
law to impose and difficult to overturn in appellate review if mandated 
by statute. In addition, it further defines fair notice under the Due 
Process Clause. If an exorbitant penalty is possible and is outlined in, it 
is applicable and ignorance is not a valid defense since reasonable 
doubts are to be resolved in favor of notification.  
 
 
KHINE  V. U. S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
334 F. SUPP. 3D 324 (D.C. CIR.  2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
After trying to seek asylum in the United States, Kay Khine 
together with the charitable organization Catholic Charities brought a 
putative class action against Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
alleging that an organization within DHS, United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) violated the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA). FOIA claims require that the plaintiff exhaust 
administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court which the 
Plaintiffs contended they could not because of the lack of information 
they were provided. The court found that the response DHS’s sent to 
Catholic Charities still granted them standing to bring the claim but 
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granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss due to Plaintiff’s failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies.  
  
Facts and Analysis: 
 
Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA , on behalf 
of Khine Catholic Charities requested materials related to Khine’s 
asylum application.103 They requested this information from USCIS 
who provided 860 pages of material and a letter explaining the statutory 
provisions under which DHS withheld certain documents.104 Plaintiffs 
filed this action to compel USCIS to explain the decision in a more 
detailed manner so they can file an administrative appeal.105 DHS's 
regulations state that a FOIA requester may file an administrative 
appeal if the agency “did not address all aspects of the [FOIA] request 
(i.e., it issued an incomplete response).106 A case brought under the 
FOIA generally requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before 
filing suit in federal court so the agency has an opportunity to exercise 
its discretion and expertise on the matter and make a factual record to 
support its decision.”107 In short, exhaustion of administrative remedies 
in a FOIA case is treated as an element of a FOIA claim, which, as with 
all elements of any claim, must be proved by the plaintiff in order to 
prevail.108  
DHS moved to dismiss the claim under jurisdictional grounds 
and substantive grounds, resting both on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies, as prescribed by statute. As to the 
jurisdictional grounds, the court found that plaintiffs were able to show 
injury in fact causation and redressability not only demonstrating the 
existence of the allegedly detrimental policy but easily proved that they 
are likely to be subjected to the policy again. However, although their 
claim was enough to satisfy the irreducible constitutional minimum for 
standing, their failure to exhaust administrative remedies would prove 
fatal to their substantive grounds.  
Plaintiffs argued DHS’s response was boilerplate listing FOIA 
exemptions without containing anything that would have triggered the 
exhaustion requirement.109 The court recognized that this argument 
                                                 
103 Khine v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., 334 F. Supp. 3d 324, 329 (D.C. 
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seemed like a Catch-22 saying “a requester cannot appeal within the 
agency because the agency has not provided the necessary information” 
but “the requester cannot go to court because the requester has not 
appealed within the agency.”110 However, the court reasoned that 
“triggered” means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing 
so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits“111  
Because plaintiffs had not met an essential element of their FOIA 
claim, the administrative exhaustion requirement, the District Court 
found dismissal appropriate.112  In declining to address the merits of the 
alleged bad faith substance of DHS’s initial response, the court noted, if 
litigation proved to be necessary after an administrative appeal, “the 
appeal decision would give this Court the benefit of the agency’s 
experience and expertise” on the issues raised by plaintiff.113 
 
Holding: 
  
 The court held that DHS’s initial response was sufficient to 
trigger FOIA’s administrative exhaustion requirement. The court’s 
decision rested on the fact that this exhaustion requirement required 
requesters to first file administrative appeal to DHS’s initial response. 
Although the requesters were not ultimately successful the court 
articulated holdings affected the further standing and justiciability of 
further claims of this nature, holding that requesters satisfied injury in 
fact elements of Article III standing to bring policy-or practice claim 
and that the administrative appeal process and the filing of a lawsuit 
would not moot requesters’ policy-or practice claim.  
 
Impact:  
This case is informative for plaintiffs who wish to bring a FOIA 
claim. Requesters should proceed accordingly knowing they must 
satisfy the exhaustion requirement before they are able to bring a 
policy-or-practice claim. The case’s impact on future FOIA claims is 
ambiguous. On one hand it is positive that in that the administrative 
appeal process and the filing of a lawsuit will not moot a requester’s 
claim. However, it seems that FOIA requires more steps and possibly 
larger litigation requirements with the required exhaustion of the first 
avenue in response to a unsatisfactory response from DHS.  
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